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them to do away with our effort to retaliate on our so-called second strike?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes; that is a possibility. It is one of the grave questions involved. I shall mention the second-strike feature later in my remarks.

Mr. SIMPSON. If the electromagnetic energy bomb had such a potential, would it not be possible to neutralize, in their silos, the Atlas, Minuteman, and the other missiles?

Mr. STENNIS. That is certainly a possibility. I say "possibility" because it is not known.

Mr. SIMPSON. I come from a State where missile sites are located, and therefore I and my people are very much interested in this subject.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from Mississippi will mention that point next. I commend the Senator for his interest in the subject.

Fifth. The United States will not be able to verify the ability of its hardened underground missile systems to survive close-in high-yield nuclear explosions. This is where the Wyoming missile sites come into the picture. They have been tested as to their workability in calmness and peace and tranquillity, and they work that way. However, we do not know how they will work with a nuclear explosion somewhere near them. When I say "near" I do not mean a direct hit or nearby. I mean a near miss. They have not been tested under those conditions. The fact is not generally known. They have not been tested as to their survivability, even though they are hardened. They have not been tested as to their survivability in case of a high-yield nuclear explosion. I do not mean that they would not survive physically, but there is a question as to the effect of electromagnetic phenomena upon them.

Mr. SIMPSON. Recently the Senator from Wyoming, with the distinguished Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON], made an inspection of the missile sites in Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska. What the Senator has just now started was discovered with respect to the hardening process and also with respect to the fact that they had not been tested out.

Mr. STENNIS. We talk about hardening, and we are told that we believe they will withstand a concussion from a nearby explosion. However, they have not been tested in that respect. We do not know how they will react from the standpoint of their electrical system and what their response will be to nuclear effects should there be an explosion nearby.

Sixth. The United States will be unable to verify the ability of its reentry vehicles and warheads to penetrate to enemy targets under defensive nuclear attack.

That means that we would be unable to verify how our missile launchers would react under attack, and whether they would work; and we would not be able to verify the ability of the warheads at the other end to survive and reach the target in a nuclear environment. We have not made complete tests under those conditions. Testing has not been completed. These are some of the haz-

ards that are involved in the reservations with which the Joint Chiefs labored, and which, in their judgment and in their recommendations, are to be cut off.

Seventh. The treaty will allow the Soviet Union to equal U.S. accomplishments in the design and performance of tactical weapons—that means smaller weapons—without any equivalent opportunity for the United States to draw even with the Soviet Union in very high-yield weapons.

This point is put in the technical language that I mentioned in the beginning. The treaty denies us testing in the atmosphere, where we are weakest. This is what should be done with regard to the missile launchers in Wyoming and elsewhere, when the missiles met air filled with effects of nuclear explosions. We would be cut off from testing in that area, in which the Soviets are strongest. They need testing with respect to weapons that can be tested underground.

Eighth. The treaty would deny a valuable source of intelligence to the United States on Soviet test programs gained from the analysis of radioactive debris. It will reinforce the difficulties already imposed by Soviet secrecy practices.

Furthermore, we were told by the Defense Atomic Support Agency, which is responsible for coordinating defense requirements for weapons effects tests and for conducting such tests that, under this treaty, it could not fulfill its mission or satisfy the needs of our military services. Similar statements were made by Gen. Bernard Schriever, commander of the Air Force Systems Command, and Gen. Thomas S. Power, Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command, which repeatedly emphasized the need for operational testing of SAC's weapons systems.

That is the operational testing that has been discussed. Not a single senior military officer claimed that the treaty would improve our military posture.

Reference was made by General Wheeler, and perhaps by others, to the possibility that there might be some benefit from stopping the Soviets from testing in the atmosphere and that this would accrue to our benefit. However, no one claims that the treaty would strengthen or improve our own military posture.

The military disadvantages which will flow from this treaty are clear, concise, and almost indisputable. The political and foreign policy advantages which are claimed for it are, in my view, nebulous, uncertain, and unconvincing.

Let me give the Senate the benefit of the views of Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., the very able director of the Livermore Laboratory of Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, upon the relationship of and necessity for continued atmospheric testing in several important areas, including the development of an ABM system and the determination of possible warhead, reentry vehicle, and missile launch site vulnerabilities. This directly bears on the military disadvantages of the treaty.

I cannot understand how Dr. Foster's testimony can be ignored. It is clear as crystal, positive, and definite. He may have been contradicted by some other

scientists on various points. However, there is nothing clearer in all the testimony, I believe, than his testimony, and this is particularly within his field. In response to a query by the subcommittee, Dr. Foster said:

The operation of an ABM system (United States or U.S.S.R.) is almost certain to involve more than one nuclear burst. The first question to ask in connection with any ABM system is whether it will work after a nuclear explosion occurs in the vicinity.

The Senator from Wyoming mentioned that point.

Such a detonation could be the result of one of our own warheads intercepting an enemy warhead, or the detonation of an enemy warhead. The problem posed by our own detonations is one which must be solved if we field any ABM system. It involves the various blackout and other electromagnetic phenomena affecting the functioning of radar, as well as the hardness of our defensive missiles. A suitable preliminary test would be to attempt to shoot at one incoming target after a nuclear weapon simulating a previous defensive burst has been exploded. All of the questions having to do with such a test have not been resolved to date. It must be borne in mind that their resolution will not come from having a general picture of the physical phenomena involved, but from actually verifying that thousands of components work after being exposed to a nuclear explosion.

That is the test he would require.

Since we have made no such tests, we do not know how closely we could space our defensive burst from either the radar or the missile vulnerability standpoint, and therefore we do not know what kind of an attack any ABM system we may propose could defend against.

The inverse problem of penetrating an enemy system—

That is, the targets—

i.e., of finding out the hardness of our own warheads and reentry vehicles, also requires atmospheric tests. The main destructive effect of a defensive burst probably comes from the combined effects of the neutrons it puts out and the blast pressure it causes. We do not know at present of a reliable way to test vulnerability to these combined effects underground.

We shall be limited to underground testing, and we do not know how to make those tests underground.

While we will try and find one, experience shows that such simulation experiments measure at best only the weaknesses of the system tested which have already been identified, with no assurance that the main weakness has been found.

A third area where atmospheric tests seem to me to be required is that of vulnerability of our bases and, possibly, of our missiles while in powered flights. Here again, the main reason for nuclear tests is not a clear-cut theoretical one, but stems from the fact that these bases, together with their missiles, are probably the most complex systems we have ever built, and that the effects of a nuclear burst on even simpler systems are not known in any detail or accuracy.

Those are not my words; they are the conclusions of Dr. Foster, the man in charge of our radiation laboratory at Livermore, Calif.

There is assurance through exercises that the bases will function if they are not attacked. There is doubt concerning their vulnerability to an actual attack. This lack

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of knowledge cannot help influencing our policy in the future.

Those are serious words, indeed. How are we to get around them? How can we act with any confidence if we stop the very kind of testing which this man says is necessary to demonstrate what will happen, with detail and accuracy, at a time when our bombers have stopped coming off the line. Those in the inventory are being decreased in numbers every day, and we are more and more, with each setting sun, depending on missiles as a defense for ourselves and the Western World. Until we know more about their vulnerability and their reliability under the most adverse conditions, how can we deny ourselves the needed testing?

In assessing the relative military advantages and disadvantages of the treaty and in determining where superiority will ultimately come to rest in the field of nuclear weaponry and delivery systems, it is important that we bear in mind that our information is limited by the closed nature of the Soviet society and by our intelligence capabilities. Even John McCone, the able and respected Director of Central Intelligence, will concede that intelligence is far from being an exact science and that available evidence does not always answer fully the difficult questions which our policy-makers must ask. In the absence of so-called hard intelligence, intelligence judgments must be substituted, and such judgments are always correct. They are particularly uncertain when they relate to the future military capabilities and intentions of an unfriendly nation. These carefully worded qualifications emphasize that no matter how thorough are the processes of intelligence collection and evaluation, uncertainties can and do remain.

I do not have to remind the Senate of the failure last fall of the intelligence community to detect the introduction of strategic missiles into Cuba until photographs of nearly operational missile sites were obtained at the eleventh hour. Cuba is only a short 90 miles from our shores and it only recently became a police state. Think how much greater the margin for error is when we are operating against a state which has developed and perfected its security techniques for more than a hundred years.

The reference to our intelligence with regard to Cuba is not a reflection upon anyone. It merely points out the great difficulties and the terrifying uncertainties in which these men operate.

If our intelligence estimates of Soviet military capabilities and intentions are significantly in error, then, this treaty may impose far greater disadvantages and risks than we can now anticipate. In any event, in order to safeguard ourselves against possible intelligence errors and deficiencies, it is essential that we maintain a clear and safe margin of military superiority over the Soviets. We possess such a margin now. I believe that it may be impossible to maintain this margin in future years if this treaty is ratified.

Finally, Mr. President, I offer one last word of warning. We are told by the

treaty advocates that the treaty is an "important first step." The fact that it is viewed as a "first step" troubles me greatly. I gravely fear that the next step may involve even more serious danger to our security.

The preamble of the treaty recites that the parties have "as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament" and also that they—the parties—seek "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time."

I am compelled to raise the question of what our commitments will be if the treaty is ratified. What will the next step be? Will we be presented with a treaty banning tests in all environments accompanied by the argument that the Senate has already endorsed such a treaty in view of the preamble of the present treaty? Will a nonaggression pact follow? Are we, by endorsing this treaty, including its preamble, indicating in advance that we approve the concept of an agreement on complete general disarmament?

I do not suggest that such a treaty will be submitted. I do not suggest that anything has been done along this line that has not been made public. I am saying that possibly this will be the next step, and that we have not given proper consideration to the implications of the first step as it may have a bearing on the second step. Certainly there is more to the picture than merely the treaty itself.

Much as I fear the effect of this so-called first step I have even greater fears of what it may portend in the way of further compacts with the Soviets which may affect the quality or quantity of our Military Establishment even more drastically. It has already been suggested that there be a reciprocal burning of bombers and that we unilaterally cut back on the production of nuclear weapons to a substantial extent. Is this treaty a first step toward activities of this type? I do not say it is; I simply raise the point that very possibly this will be a part of the picture. We are not getting the proper concessions. We are not getting any kind of inspection agreements. We are not committing Russia in the fields in which she needs most to be committed. We have given her the advantage of testing underground. The treaty within itself does not make any real progress.

I doubt that we can appraise intelligently the desirability of this treaty as a first step unless we know what successive steps are contemplated. I must again wonder whether the ratification of this treaty will be interpreted, in view of its preamble, as expressing the sense of the Senate that it approves in principle of an agreement banning all nuclear testing without proper inspections, or that it approves in principle of a general and complete disarmament treaty.

People ask me, "What kind of treaty, then, would you agree to?"

It is not necessary to agree to a treaty with someone in whom we have no confidence. As I see it, in the beginning, the really fair and square treaty, the only kind that would be acceptable,

would be a treaty to stop nuclear testing, with each nation verifying the other's actions by having reasonable and fully enforceable on-the-spot inspection.

The number of inspections that we, in our talks and negotiations, claimed were necessary was 30, then 20, then down to 15, and on down to 12. Then we said that seven would be sufficient, and at least one of our civilian high defense officials has indicated that he thought five would be adequate.

Mr. President, as I have stated, I have grave and serious misgivings about the treaty. Upon the information which is available to me, I can only view it as a step toward degrading the security of the United States—not as a first step toward the peaceful world we all desire. I agree wholeheartedly with the conclusion of the report of the Preparedness Subcommittee that serious—perhaps even formidable—military and technical disadvantages to the United States will result if the treaty is ratified.

Those are not just my words. Those words are concurred in by every member of this seven-member subcommittee, except the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], who thought they were a little too pessimistic.

I repeat that I agree wholeheartedly with the conclusion of the report of the Preparedness Subcommittee that serious—perhaps even formidable—military and technical disadvantages to the United States will result if the treaty is ratified. In my judgment, these are not outweighed or counterbalanced by the somewhat doubtful political advantages which would result. I, for one, cannot find it in my heart in today's world to cast my vote in favor of approval of a treaty which admittedly will make it impossible for us to develop and produce the highest quality of weapons of which our science and technology are capable. Particularly is this true when all of the evidence available to me leads to the conclusion that the Soviets will be inhibited by the treaty primarily in the fields in which they already have superiority.

For all of these reasons, I will cast my vote against approval of the treaty.

Mr. President, I have concluded my speech.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator from Mississippi yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART in the chair). Does the Senator from Mississippi yield to the Senator from Louisiana?

Mr. STENNIS. Since the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] has been waiting, I yield first to him. Then I will yield to the Senator from Louisiana. I had previously asked the Senator from Arkansas to wait.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] and other Senators have raised question about executive agreements in connection with treaties. I have had prepared a memorandum on this subject; and if the Senator from Mississippi will agree, I should like to have it printed in the RECORD.

Mr. STENNIS. I am very glad to agree. I am sure the Senator from Ar-



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correctly stated. Such did happen in the 1930's. But, so far as I know, nothing of that nature has happened within the past decade or so.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct.

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. TALMADGE. The Senator from Georgia made no such reference with respect to the present treaty.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand that. I was merely bringing out the fact.

Mr. TALMADGE. The Senator from Georgia was merely upholding the position taken by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi that no treaty could have any force or effect without ratification by two-thirds of the Members of the Senate of the United States.

The Senator from Georgia, also, was pointing out that there have been instances in our history when executive agreements have nullified State constitutions. Such agreements were never submitted to the Senate; and the Senator from Georgia was deploring that fact.

Mr. STENNIS. That is correct.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Senator from Georgia is exactly correct, as he usually is. When I came into the Chamber I heard a reference to an executive agreement. Not knowing the connection, I wished to make doubly sure that so far as the instrument under consideration is concerned there was no such thought in mind.

I am delighted that both the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Mississippi have indicated that the instrument now before the Senate is the kind of treaty which is subject to advice and consent and a two-thirds vote by Members of the Senate.

Mr. TALMADGE. There was no contention to the contrary.

Mr. STENNIS. I assure the Senator from Montana that this is one time when the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Mississippi are not getting out of bounds according to the Senator's standards.

Mr. President, I resume my remarks.

The true role of the Senate in the making of treaties was defined by Rufus King on the floor of the Senate on January 12, 1818. Senator King had been a delegate from Massachusetts to the Constitutional Convention. He later was elected U.S. Senator from New York. This is what he said:

In these concerns the Senate are the constitutional and the only responsible counselors of the President. And in this capacity the Senate may, and ought to, look into and watch over every branch of the foreign affairs of the Nation; they may, therefore, at any time call for full and exact information respecting the foreign affairs, and express their opinion and advice to the President respecting the same, when, and under whatever other circumstances, they may think such advice expedient.

To make a treaty includes all the proceedings by which it is made; and the advice and consent of the Senate being necessary in the making of treaties, must necessarily be so, touching the measures employed in making the same. The Constitution does not say that treaties shall be concluded, but

that they shall be made, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; none therefore can be made without such advice and consent; and the objections against the agency of the Senate in making treaties, or in advising the President to make the same, cannot be sustained, but by giving to the Constitution an interpretation different from its obvious and most salutary meaning.

I emphasize this not because anyone seeks to do otherwise with respect to the pending treaty, but because there has been an argument made many times. It was even repeated in a news conference, as I understand the report in the papers, when the President of the United States pointed out that we have gone so far we cannot turn back. A conclusion like that ignores, for the time being, the essential mandate of the Constitution of the United States that these matters can be concluded only in the Senate.

Furthermore, do any of us here really believe that the role of this Nation as leader and protector of the free world rests on such an unsubstantial foundation as the vagaries of so-called world opinion? The sources of our power and our wealth will not be altered by our rejection of this treaty. These are the bases for our claim to leadership. Do these statements imply that our historical role and our membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Central Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, the Organization of American States, our foreign aid and military aid programs, our defense of Korea and Berlin, and our support of the United Nations will be forgotten? Do such statements imply that our worldwide friendships and bilateral alliances will be shattered by the rejection of the treaty? I do not believe it at all.

World opinion is too inconstant to be made the basis for foreign policy. World opinion was not outraged when the Soviet Union shattered the 3-year moratorium on nuclear testing in September 1961. I challenge the contention that this Nation is such a feeble reed that it will bend under the temporary displeasure of other nations which are surrendering nothing by signing this treaty, and which, in the final analysis, have a direct interest in the maintenance by this Nation of a strong and vital deterrent to the aggressive tendencies of the Soviet Union.

Let me say a further word about the Joint Chiefs and their role in this matter. From the testimony which I heard beginning last September I am convinced that the Chiefs were not fully consulted about the military aspects and implications of the various nuclear test ban proposals. I am convinced that this is true with respect to the treaty now pending before us. Their role in this matter seems to have been consistently downgraded, and I am concerned about the thinking of those who would commit to us a treaty which has such a direct and momentous effect on our Military Establishment without full, exhaustive, and thorough consultation with our top military planners.

I say this again with all deference to all parties concerned, military and civilian. Even apart from the treaty, these

words need to be said. Not in criticism of anyone, but these words should be said with reference to the necessity of our top military men being consulted in advance. As General LeMay said, the decision had already been made. The lights had already been run—to say whether they were green or red is only argumentative. So far as the executive department is concerned, the matter had been concluded when the military men got into it in a comprehensive way.

I know that there are those who have given assurance that the Chiefs were fully consulted, but let me cite the record. First, there is the fact that, for some strange reason, no high-ranking military officer accompanied the Harriman delegation to Moscow.

I asked Secretary Rusk in the open hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations why one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or some other military representative was not taken to Moscow. I received a very fine answer. He said it was not considered necessary. I do not know exactly how to interpret that. It could have been a short answer, although I am sure he did not mean to be curt. Giving it a literal interpretation, it was said that no military adviser was needed.

Next I cite a question and answer exchange from General LeMay's testimony on August 16:

Senator GOLDWATER. Did Mr. McNamara visit with you prior to the departure of Mr. Harriman to Moscow?

General LEMAY. No, sir.

Senator GOLDWATER. On this treaty? Has he visited with you since on this treaty?

General LEMAY. No, sir.

General LeMay also said Secretary McNamara "did not come down to a full meeting of the Joint Chiefs and discuss the treaty. He did not discuss it with me personally."

Adm. George W. Anderson, Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations, when he appeared before the Subcommittee on August 23, was asked "did Secretary McNamara consult with you about this specific treaty?" He replied:

To the best of my recollection, Secretary McNamara did not discuss this particular treaty with the Joint Chiefs of Staff while I was present prior to the first of August.

There was then the following question and answer:

Mr. KENDALL. Then I take it that you are saying that there was no discussion by Secretary McNamara with you or the Joint Chiefs when you were present prior to Mr. Harriman going to Moscow and proposing this treaty.

Admiral ANDERSON. On this particular treaty, that is correct.

The fact that the Joint Chiefs were not consulted and given the opportunity to present their views as to the military implications of the treaty prior to our commitment comes through loud and clear on the record before the Subcommittee.

Let me now discuss rather briefly the military and technical aspects and implications of missile tests bans—a subject on which the Preparedness Subcommittee held hearing for 11 months. There is little doubt that the depth and range of these inquiries was greater than any

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conducted by any other committee of the Congress on this subject in a long while.

Before entering into a discussion of the military implications of the treaty, however, I would like to point out a fact that seems to have been generally overlooked. This fact is that exactly one-half—12 of the 24, to be precise—of the witnesses who appeared before the subcommittee are identified by backers of the treaty as being proponents of it. These were Adm. George Anderson, former Chief of Naval Operations; Dr. Norris E. Bradbury, Director of Los Alamos Laboratory; Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering; William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Dr. Leland Haworth, then with the AEC; Gen. Curtis LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff; Dr. Franklin Long, then ACDA's Director of Science and Technology; John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence; Adm. David McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations; Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Going back over the several pages of the Senator's manuscript, it seems to me the impression may be gathered, on the basis of the testimony cited, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were under some compulsion to accept this treaty. I wish to state for the record that is not so. I know the Senator from Mississippi has not stated that and does not intend that, but I am afraid the implication may get out that some sort of pressure was used.

I recall, for example, that the distinguished Chairman of the Defense Committee asked the question directly of General LeMay and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if there was any pressure exerted. The answer was "No."

I can well imagine anyone exerting any pressure on members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the caliber of General LeMay and his colleagues.

Then, during the course of the executive hearing, since which time the record has been cleared, the question was asked specifically by the Senator from Montana—now speaking—of each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if he was in favor of the ratification of this treaty, and the answers came back, yes, they were, provided the four safeguards—which the Senator knows about—were included.

To the best of my knowledge, every single Senator was then and is now in favor of these safeguards. To the best of my knowledge, there were no pressures used on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To the best of my knowledge, each member of the Joint Chiefs, when asked, individually stated he was for the ratification of the treaty, provided the four safeguards were included.

In the statement made by the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Preparedness, I point to the fact that he has stated that "exactly one-half—

12 of the 24, to be precise—of the witnesses who appeared before the subcommittee are identified by backers of the treaty as being proponents of it."

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I interrupt the Senator from Montana?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

Mr. STENNIS. May I inquire why the Senator from Montana asked the Senator from Mississippi to yield? Does he have a question to propound?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I beg the Senator's pardon. As I said in the beginning, I was not disagreeing with what the Senator said, but I was concerned about what interpretation might be placed on it. I thought, for the purpose of the Record, it might be well to bring up this question.

Mr. STENNIS. Go ahead and finish your question, please.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No; that is enough.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. The Senator from Iowa has been sitting here during the Senator's very able speech. I thought perhaps I should make clear that my interpretation of what the Senator from Mississippi has been getting at is that, first, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not coerced—

Mr. MANSFIELD. No; were not consulted.

Mr. STENNIS. That is second.

Mr. MILLER. Second, at least one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said had it not been negotiated and signed by many other countries, he probably would have been against the treaty.

As I deduce what the Senator from Mississippi is getting at, the so-called unilateral action or so-called world opinion being put forward as a consideration for the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not, in his opinion, a fair consideration for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have to evaluate.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Iowa. I thank the Senator from Montana, too. The Senator from Iowa has summed up the situation.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me in connection with the question of the Senator from Iowa?

Mr. STENNIS. I will always yield to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. On page 394 of the Committee on Foreign Relations hearings—and this particular part was originally taken in executive session—

Mr. STENNIS. If the Senator from Arkansas will permit me, before he goes into that subject, I wish to be courteous to any Senator, but there is some consideration due to a Senator who has the floor. Will the Senator permit me to complete my remarks, which will not take very long?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Certainly. The Senator has every right to complete his remarks without any interruption. It was only because the Senator from Iowa injected this thought and left it in the air that I thought—

Mr. STENNIS. I thought the Senator from Arkansas was about to discuss what General LeMay said.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It had to do with the point which the Senator from Iowa raised.

Mr. STENNIS. I want to be courteous to the Senator from Arkansas, who is compelled to be absent from the Chamber part of the time, but I should like to complete this speech.

It was on the basis of all of the testimony which the subcommittee heard that we reached the conclusion that the treaty would result in the following military disadvantages:

First. The United States will not be able to match the performance already demonstrated by the Soviet Union in weapons yielding more than about 30 megatons. We are told that the United States has no requirement for such weapons. The statement is not fully accurate. The record will disclose that a military requirement for such a device has been expressly stated. It has not been granted, but its requirements have been stated.

Second. The United States, by being unable to test such very high yield weapons, will continue to be unable to realistically assess their military value. The reference here is to so-called big bombs.

Third. The United States will not be able to acquire the knowledge it needs on the performance of weapons at high altitude. Without such tests there will be unresolved uncertainties about both the warheads and radar performance of any antiballistic missile system employing nuclear weapons.

Fourth. The United States will be unable to prove the performance and reliability of antiballistic missile systems under conditions in which the defensive missiles, the radars and the warheads are exposed to nuclear explosions. Without the confidence that such testing alone will bring, I believe it is unlikely that any program as demanding of national resources as this may prove to be will ever reach operational status. Gen. Curtis LeMay told us:

I think you probably can build one (an ABM system) that will work, but how well it is going to work, what degree of efficiency it is going to have is something else again \* \* \*. The thing you will not know is how effective our radar and control and guidance system is going to be \* \* \* under conditions of nuclear war. This we do not know \* \* \* and I would prefer to test.

That is a military man speaking on a military subject. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. SIMPSON. We are all deeply concerned about this matter and gravely interested in it, of course. Because of the experience of the Senator from Mississippi, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Preparedness, I wish to ask him whether it is not correct to say that in the course of the testimony adduced before this committee it was revealed by the witnesses that the high-test yield of Russian bombs enabled them to procure advantages from the standpoint of the antiballistic missile missile.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes; they are related.

Mr. SIMPSON. Would it not be possible that by the very use of the high test explosive they did procure some information with respect to the electro-magnetic energy bomb, which would enable